We document that the deregulation of bank branching restrictions in the United States triggered a reallocation across sectors, with end effects on state-level volatility. The aggregate effects at the state level cannot be explained simply by shifts in disaggregated sector level returns and volatility. This suggests a reallocation effect is at play. To study this effect, we provide a benchmark allocation based on mean-variance portfolio theory applied to sectoral returns. We find that the realized sectoral allocation of output at the state level converges towards this benchmark allocation, at a rate that is hastened following the deregulation. This partly occurs because sectors with zero weight in the benchmark allocation see their share of total output shrink. We show convergence is particularly strong in sectors characterized by young, small and external finance dependent firms, and for states that have a larger share of such sectors. The findings are robust to the endogeneity of deregulation dates. They suggest that improving bank access to branching affects sectoral specialization (or diversification) of output, in a manner that depends on the variance-covariance properties of sectoral returns, rather than on their average only.
Introduction
Over the past decade, an extensive literature in international finance has confirmed the role of financial development as an important catalyst for growth and allocative efficiency. The catalytic effects of financial development can arise through two channels, not necessarily mutually exclusive: First, there could be an improvement in the levels of growth of individual sectors in the economy, as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) . Second, there could be reallocation effects, i.e. an improvement in the allocation of aggregate capital across sectors given unchanged growth rates, as in Wurgler (2000) . Our goal in this paper is to investigate the link between financial development and reallocation effects, focusing on the precise nature of specialization (or diversification) of output in the real economy. In particular, we study the effect of deregulation in bank-branching restrictions in the United States (US) on the allocation of output across sectors in US states. In the process, we provide a methodology inspired by mean-variance portfolio analysis to measure and benchmark such reallocation effects.
We use data on Gross State Product (GSP) from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) from 1977 to 2000. 1 We approximate the return for a sector (state) by the growth rate of output in that sector (state). Table 1 crystallizes the empirical importance of reallocation effects. We extend the approach in Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and investigate shifts in growth and volatility around the years when intrastate bank branching restrictions were lifted for different states. At the state level, growth rates increase on average as in Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) , and their volatility falls as in Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) . Interestingly, when estimated at the disaggregated, sectoral level, the same specification yields different results. Growth rates continue to increase but the effect is only half the magnitude of the state-level effect. Volatility, in turn, is left largely unchanged. Thus, it must be that pure reallocation effects contribute significantly to explaining aggregate, state-level results, especially as regards the fall in volatility.
While the literature has often considered aggregate growth and volatility separately, our focus on reallocation across sectors provides a natural way of analyzing the two effects jointly.
To facilitate an econometric analysis of the exact nature of reallocation, we structure our approach around a classic model of the diversification motive, which embeds both growth and volatility effects. For each state, we construct a benchmark set of sectoral weights based on the portfolio-theoretic notion of mean-variance efficiency (MVE) . To this end, we use the time-series of sectoral returns to calculate for each state the expected return and variancecovariance matrix of returns with eighteen (or ten) consolidated sectors. Next, we numerically compute the MVE frontier for each state in the mean return -standard deviation space and identify the resulting tangency portfolio. It is the tangency portfolio that determines each state's benchmark allocation of output across sectors in the state. 2 Then, for each state and at each point of time, we compute the Euclidean distance between the MVE frontier and the expected return and volatility for the state, where expected return and volatility fluctuate over time only because of changes in each state's allocation of output across sectors. In the same vein, we also compute the gaps for each state at each point of time between expected return, expected volatility or realized output shares and their MVE counterparts.
We then ask how these distance and gap measures relate to intrastate bank branching deregulation dates. To account for the specificity and partial irreversibility of capital, we allow the effect of deregulation on these measures to be gradual rather than instantaneous.
In particular, we investigate the time-series properties of the gap measures, and whether their convergence is affected by deregulation. We find that the distance to the MVE frontier shrinks significantly faster following deregulation, and so the long-run distance is significantly smaller in deregulated state-years. Volatility also converges faster towards the MVE benchmark following deregulation. But we do not find a significant effect of deregulation on convergence of the level of returns. Put another way, the primary effect of the imposition of branching restrictions appears to have been to limit the diversification of state-level output across sectors. This is consistent with the results in Table 1. As will become clear, our approach enables us to control for putative shifts in the characteristics of returns around deregulation dates. In other words, we purge our estimates from a phenomenon well documented in the literature: that growth rates are directly affected by bank branching deregulation. We focus instead on pure reallocation effects, i.e. on the difference between state and sector estimates in Table 1 . In particular, the fact that we find little evidence of growth-enhancing reallocation does not mean bank branching deregulation does not affect growth performance: It just means that state-level growth increased because the returns themselves shifted at the sector level. State-level volatility, in constrast, fell mostly because of a reallocation mechanism.
Observed sectoral shares of output also converge significantly faster towards their benchmark MVE levels -as implied by a tangency portfolio -after bank branching deregulation.
A number of sectors have weights equal to zero according to the MVE allocation. The documented convergence partly relies on the gradual disappearance of these sectors. This illustrates indirectly the usefulness of benchmark MVE computations that account for the variance-covariance properties of sectoral returns in each state. Specifically, the frontier implies distinct patterns of specialization (or diversification) rather than ones that simply average shares for all sectors. Some sectors should see their output share shrink, and in the data they do, especially following bank branching deregulation.
Why should a mean-variance framework be relevant in determining banks' loan portfolios and ultimately the observed patterns of production at the state level? First, diversification of the loan portfolio at banks may arise in response to agency problems between diversified investors and a delegated monitor. This is, for instance, the key mechanism for a diversified bank emerging as the efficient structure of a delegated monitor in Diamond (1984) . Given their role as monitors, banks need to maintain some specialization and are thus naturally likely to invest predominantly at the local level. 3 Hence, we proxy for the achievable (benchmark) diversification of banks through a mean-variance framework at the state level. The choice of mean-variance setup is motivated by tractability and its economic appeal in capturing portfolio diversification. The level of the state offers a good proxy for locality, both economically as well as in terms of granularity at which data are available.
Second, the effect of bank portfolio choices will ultimately affect the observed levels of local production. Such an effect is better measured with GSP data rather than through 3 Local bias in bank lending has been empirically well-documented. Petersen and Rajan (2002) , show that, although the median distance of bank lending increased though the 1970-90s, it was as small as 5.0 miles in 1990-93. Further, whilst the the proportion of unit (single branch) banks has fallen, it remained significant even after deregulation, resulting in local diversification being the only strategy for many banks. In 1977, 8,373 (58%) from a total 14,411 banks were unit banks. In 2000 this statistic had reduced to 2,528 (30%) unit banks from a total of 8,315 banks. More broadly, the empirical literature in finance has asked whether information frictions can explain home bias in shareholder portfolios (see French and Poterba (1991) and Lewis (1999) ). Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) have documented that professional investment managers also exhibit a strong preference for locally headquartered firms, particularly small, highly levered firms that produce non-traded goods. stock market data: banks lend significantly to small and private firms whose production is captured in the GSP data but not reflected in stock market data; further, banks are not typically invested in the equity of even large firms they lend to. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) , for instance, present data showing that bank loans in the United States contributed approximately 50% of total corporate financing through the 1990's, and that, on average, 85% of bank financing was to private firms.
We investigate the channels through which convergence toward the benchmark allocation occurs following deregulation. We examine which sectors and which states converge faster as a result of branching deregulation. In the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998) , we find that output shares converge significantly faster for sectors that are characterized by young and small firms (more likely to be financially constrained and dependent on bank finance), and that rely on external finance. Sectors with younger and smaller firms have higher average growth and higher growth volatility. They also have output shares that are significantly below their benchmark MVE levels at the beginning of our sample, but not at the end. What is more, these sectors contribute increasingly to overall state output following banking deregulation. These findings are reminiscent of the analysis in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) who argue theoretically that investments in high risk, high return technologies may be attained only after sufficiently high levels of diversification have been reached. Rather than assuming the returns themselves increase, we stress a reallocation effect following diversification, whereby more resources are allocated to risky sectors with high growth prospects.
In a similar vein, we find that the states experiencing fastest convergence following deregulation are ones where there is a significantly greater share of sectors populated by young and small firms. Interestingly, they also tend to be large states, wherein the geographical and informational distance between firms and banks is likely to be greater on average, and, in turn, diversification gains to banks from branching deregulation are likely to be higher as well.
In robustness checks, we rule out several alternative hypotheses. First, we show that our results hold also for the subset of states for which we can compute a "clean" MVE frontier, constructed using data exclusively posterior to the deregulation date. Second, we show that there is no convergence towards alternative benchmark allocations. The allocation of output does not converge to a naive frontier ascribing equal weights to all sectors, or computed with zero covariance terms. These results suggest the convergence properties we document are not mechanical. For instance, we do not merely find reallocation towards high growth sectors; how much they co-vary with other sectors is crucial. Third, the exclusion of stable sectors (Government, Health and Education) and of a directly affected sector (Finance, Insurance and Real Estate) does not affect the results either. Fourth, the convergence results are also insensitive to the choice of assumed interest rate for computing the tangency portfolio of the MVE frontier and to the use of a GMM estimator.
It is conceivable that branching deregulation could arise because of an exogenous need to move away from a given pattern of allocation across sectors, for instance because of technological change. Then, financial deregulation and reallocation toward a specific specialization pattern would both occur because of unobserved developments, and our estimates would be biased. If these unobserved developments are economy-wide, then the bias should prevail equally in sectors populated by young or old, small or large firms, and irrespective of a technological need for external finance. Our evidence on differential effects between firms that seem constrained and others alleviates these endogeneity concerns to some extent. We also explicitly demonstrate that the branching deregulation dates are not related to the likely benefits of deregulation, measured, for example, by the initial distance of a state's allocation from the benchmark MVE frontier.
Finally, even after branching deregulation is completed, the extent of out-of-state bank capital acts to hasten convergence. This finding suggests that access to greater finance through interstate banking flows is essential in order to realize fully the economic benefits of intrastate branching. In fact we show the crucial outcome of branching deregulation that affects sectoral allocation of output appears to be the emergence of larger, better-diversified and healthier banks, rather than simply an increase in the number of banks or branches operating in a state.
Overall, our findings imply that financial development has important consequences for the specialization of output in a manner that depends directly on the variance-covariance properties of sectoral returns, as implied by the literature on mean-variance efficiency. The paper's contribution is also methodological. The simple notion of mean-variance efficiency based on a trade-off between risk and return has been argued to have limitations from a dynamic standpoint, especially in the context of financial investments. The notion nevertheless stands useful in a positive sense. Even if one does not consider the MVE frontier to be the optimal one, observed allocations seem to converge towards it. To show this, we compute the sum of absolute pairwise differences in observed sector shares of output between all distinct pairs of states in our sample. This discrepancy reflects the evolution of differences in state-level 6 specializations of output. We show that there is a permanent discrepancy between state-level specializations, but that this is well explained by differences in the benchmark specialization patterns, given by each state's MVE frontier. In other words, the frontier serves as an attractive tool for understanding the direction in which the output patterns of US states evolve over time and in response to financial development.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature.
Section 3 presents our econometric methodology and data. Section 4 presents the results on convergence properties of output allocation and Section 5 investigates channels through which banking deregulation affects this convergence. Section 6 presents a discussion of robustness tests and related issues. Section 7 concludes.
Related literature
The notion that financial development should affect growth directly is decades old. King and Levine (1993) and Levine and Zervos (1996) established the empirical link at the aggregate level, while Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) decompose the effect into the responses of total factor productivity and capital accumulation. In disaggregated data, Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that financial development affects growth more for those sectors that tend to rely on external finance for technological reasons. Beck et al. (2008) extend this work to find that financial development also eases constraints within sectors that are more dependent on small firms. Fisman and Love (2004) provide evidence on a finance-growth nexus on the basis of co-movements in growth rates of countries at similar levels of industrial and financial development. Chari and Henry (2002) document that opening financial markets to foreign investment results in greater growth for capital-poor countries.
Using the same set of events as we do, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) establish a link between the lifting of intrastate bank-branching restrictions and economic growth at the US state level. Strahan (2003) refines this finding and shows this growth acceleration was particularly pronounced in the entrepreneurial sector. In a recent paper, Huang (2008) questions the robustness of these conclusions and finds that out of the 23 deregulation events that he examines, only five give rise to statistically significant growth accelerations.
Reallocation away from unattractive projects and towards high potential activities figures prominently in the list of proposed explanations for the growth effect. A relatively recent literature has investigated this possibility upfront. Wurgler (2000) shows that well-developed 7 capital markets are conducive of investment efficiency in that they tend to direct investment towards sectors that turn out to grow fast subsequently, and away from declining sectors. Bekaert et al (2007) find financial development has significant reallocation effects towards sectors with high growth potential, as proxied by their stock value. The argument rests on the assumption that subsequent growth is exogenous to the current allocation of capital:
financial markets excel at picking sectors with high growth prospects, but expected growth itself is taken as given.
More granular data, for instance at the level of the firm, have shed further light on the mechanisms at play. Black and Strahan (2005) show that new incorporations increased in the US post interstate banking deregulation and more so where the fraction of assets held by large banks was greater. Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar (2007) study the deregulation of the French banking sector in the mid-1980s and document that in bank-dependent sectors, deregulation led to decline in bank credit for worse-performing firms, higher firm-creation and exit rates, and higher market share for better-performing firms.
The majority of these studies have focused -explicitly or implicitly -on growth effects. A few papers have also pointed to changes in volatility, working through -once again explicitly or implicitly -reallocation or diversification mechanisms not unlike what we document in this paper. For instance, Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) show that state-level macroeconomic stability has increased in the US post banking deregulation. Demyanyk, Ostergaard and Sorensen (2007) show that the amount of interstate personal insurance increased following the deregulation of the US banking restrictions, and reason this reflects better diversification opportunities. In a cross-section of countries, Larrain (2006) provides evidence that access to bank finance dampens output volatility at the industrial level thanks to countercyclical borrowing by financially constrained sectors. This is a result of better risk pooling and diversification by banks.
Diversification motives are prominent in accounting for lower volatility in these papers.
But they are absent from the conventional model of capital allocation, which typically relies on differences across sectors in the marginal return to capital. Then, capital chases higher returns until they are equalized. Our focus on an alternative view where returns are given (or stabilized at a steady state) and where their covariances matter, puts diversification motives back in the front row. It does so in a framework where it is possible to think jointly about the growth and volatility effects of finance, consistent with a vast (but disjoint) literature.
One of the few papers going down this route is a study by Raddatz (2006) , who analyses both growth and volatility effects at the international level. He shows that sectors with large inventories (assumed to capture liquidity needs) have greater volatility of output growth and lower output growth in underdeveloped financial markets.
We also provide evidence (for instance in Table 1 ) that reallocation effects are prominent in explaining the response of volatility, but less important in accounting for higher growth in response to financial deregulation. One interpretation is that new activities, with higher growth prospects, become available with financial development. Average returns at the sector level increase, but not because of reallocation amongst existing activities. Rather it is the returns themselves that directly shift. The result, which follows immediately from our meanvariance framework, is consistent with recent theories of the interactions between finance and the macroeconomy. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) for instance suggest that investment in risky sectors may not take off until investors have a critical level of portfolio diversification. Saint-Paul (1992) , Obstfeld (1994) and Black (1987) all propose similar theories of production where access to finance facilitates specialization in attractive yet risky activities.
3 Methodology and data
Benchmark mean-variance allocations
Let Y i,s,t denote nominal output, measured by GSP, for sector i in state s in year t. We measure returns {R s,i,t } as the log output growth rate, ln(Y i,s,t /Y i,s,t−1 ). Our key assumption requires that the distribution properties of returns {R s,i,t } be time-invariant. We later provide support for the assumption in our sample. Given this, we estimate E[R] s and Σ s , the vector of expected (average) returns and the variance-covariance matrix of returns on sectors in state s. Let w s,i denote the weight of sector i in total output of state s. We compute the mean-variance portfolios for state s as the vector of weights w across sectors i obtained from the program
for varying values of σ, the volatility of returns. State indexes are omitted for simplicity.
The mean-variance efficient (MVE) frontier is the set of points {(μ(σ), σ)} in the mean -standard deviation space, whereμ(σ) = w E[R], the maximized expected return from the above program for volatility σ. It is well known from portfolio theory that the efficient frontier is a hyperbola so we restrict the mappingμ(σ) to correspond to the higher of the 9 two possible mean returns for a given volatility σ. The inverse mapping will be denoted aŝ σ(µ).
Realized weights for state s in year t are denoted as
is the share of sector i's output in the total gross output of state s. The expected return and volatility of state s in year t, given the realized weights in year t, are denoted as µ s,t and σ s,t , respectively, where µ s,t = w s,t E[R] s , and, σ s,t = w s,t Σ s w s,t , with obvious vector notation.
We define the Euclidean distance to the MVE frontier of state s in year t as
In words, from a given point (µ s,t , σ s,t ) in the mean -standard deviation space, we traverse distances moving west and north separately (in a straight line) until the MVE frontier is met. While this definition of distance to the frontier runs throughout the paper, we will also demonstrate robustness of our results to alternative definitions.
Our first convergence test examines how distance for state s converges to its MVE counterpart (which is zero), and whether deregulation of the banking sector has had any effect on this relationship. We estimate the convergence equation
where DEREG s,t is a binary variable taking value one if the banking sector in state s has been deregulated by year t. We are interested in whether β < 0, that is whether deregulation hastens the convergence towards efficiency. 4 Since the MVE frontier is estimated with error, there is an attenuating bias in estimates of α and β. This works against finding a significant effect of deregulation. The inclusion of state and time fixed effects enables us to capture the pure within-state effects of deregulation. We also allow for clustered standard errors by state.
We next define a tangency portfolio on the MVE frontier. For a constant risk-free rate r, we can define a benchmark MVE allocation of output for each state corresponding to the tangency point between the frontier and a straight line arising from holding the risk-free asset. 5 A mean-variance efficient investor with complete access to the risk-free asset and the investment portfolio of the state would choose a risk-return tradeoff along this tangency line.
The tangency portfolio for state s is denoted as (µ * s , σ * s ), and the corresponding output shares for each sector i as {w * s,i }.
Since our focus is on reallocation, we investigate how the time-varying expected return and volatility for state s and its realized output shares relate to their MVE counterpartsreturn, volatility and weights of the tangency portfolio. In particular, we seek to establish whether the deregulation of the banking sector has affected this relationship.
We estimate
As in equation (1), the inclusion of state (or state-by-sector) and time effects helps us isolate the within-state (within-state-by-sector) effect of deregulation. We are again interested in whether estimates of β are non-positive. This would have two implications. First, equations
(2) and (3) test whether deregulation hastens convergence towards efficiency in expected returns and volatilities. Negative estimates for β will also imply long run State growth and volatility that are closer to their MVE levels, and an average vector of long run output shares closer to the MVE allocation. Second, equation (4) verifies whether deregulation induces a reallocation across sectors within a state in the direction implied by the tangency portfolio weights for that state. 6
To summarize, equations (1)-(3) are tests of the convergence of state-level aggregates towards MVE benchmarks, whereas equation (4) is a test of reallocation at the sector-level within a state toward MVE frontier weights. The latter will be the lynch-pin of our analysis in Section 5 where we investigate the channels through which deregulation affects reallocation.
In particular, we will examine the characteristics of those sectors and states where reallocation effects are faster in response to financial development.
We assume throughout a time-invariant covariance matrix of returns. Later in this section we verify that the assumption can be maintained in our data. There is however a specific kind is assumed to apply period after period and the risk-free rate taken to be the average return realized on government treasuries for a one-year horizon. For most of the paper, we take the risk-free rate to be simply zero. As a robustness check in Section 6, we show that our results are not sensitive to the choice of a specific value for the risk-free rate. 6 Since the weights across sectors in a given state add up to one, we drop one sector, Agricultural services, from the estimation of equation (4). of shift in mean returns (or potentially their volatility) documented in the literature, namely the possibility that returns themselves should shift with deregulation. What if returns were indeed systematically higher, or less volatile, post-deregulation? Would assuming this away not create a bias in our estimates? We now detail why our specifications are robust to this possibility. Suppose for instance we do not measure the true benchmark return µ * s , as a result of a violation of our time invariance assumption. In particular, assume the benchmark return we compute,μ s,t , be different from its true value as follows
where we have allowed for a systematic shift in state returns around the deregulation date, captured byγ 1 . This is what Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) find. Consider now the specification in equation (2). It is easy to convince oneself that disregarding a break in returns because of branching deregulations will not affect estimates of β, sinceγ 1 is effectively subsumed in estimates of γ in equation (2). 7 This is the sense in which our approach purges direct effects on returns, to focus instead on reallocation effects. It is straightforward to extend the same argument to systematic shifts in volatility around deregulation.
The argument also generalizes to estimates at the sector level. We later split our data according to criteria customarily associated with constrained access to external finance, and find convergence is strongest in constrained sectors and states. It is important to ensure these differential effects are not driven by our assumption of time invariance. Suppose again we do not measure the true benchmark weights, because our time invariance assumption is invalid along the sectoral dimension. To be precise, assume the benchmark weights we compute, w s,i,t , differ from their true benchmark level as follows:
where CON ST R denotes a binary variable used to identify constrained sectors. Our computed benchmark weights may differ from the true MVE weights because returns may be higher (and/or less volatile) after deregulation (γ 1 ), in constrained sectors (δ) or indeed in constrained sectors after deregulations (γ 2 ), as demonstrated in Rajan and Zingales (1998) .
Consider now the specification in equation (4). Measurement error of the types considered is not going to affect our estimates of interest:δ will only affect estimates of δ s,i , andγ 1 and γ 2 will only affect estimates of γ. In other words, our results are robust to shifts in returns around deregulation dates, even if these behave in a systematically different manner across constrained or unconstrained sectors.
Data
Our data on nominal Gross State Product (GSP) for the 50 US states and the District of Our data are measured at the sectoral level, with as few as 10 or 18 sectors. This level of aggregation is consistent with common practice when estimating MVE frontiers. It does however seem coarse from the standpoint of capturing putative reallocations, for which firm level information may be more helpful. Can we hope to observe output reallocations around deregulation dates across 10 or 18 such coarsely defined economic activities? Can we hope for the observed characteristics of these sectors to matter measurably in the process of reallocation? We view these questions as largely empirical. We note however that, if anything, the coarseness of our data makes it relatively more difficult to find significant effects.
Our intrastate deregulation dates, and the measures of out of state capital in the banking sector are from Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) . Deregulation of the US banking sector began in earnest in the 1970s (see Kroszner and Strahan (1999) 
Time invariance and stationarity
We just showed that shifts in the mean of returns, or their volatility, may indeed exist in our data around deregulation dates. We also argued in Section 3.1 that our econometric approach can accommodate such shifts. Our key assumption maintains that returns display no further non-stationarity, both in terms of their mean and their volatility, beyond the structural breaks documented in Tables 1 and 2 . In what follows, we perform tests of non-stationarity in returns to investigate the validity of this assumption. We shall interpret rejection of nonstationarity as supportive of the hypothesis of "time invariance" in a stochastic context. Of course, we do not claim that returns are actually constant. We only need their variations to be short lived, and zero in expectation. (2003), performed on sectoral data. The null hypothesis maintains that all series in the panel be non-stationary, as against the alternative that some are not. We purge the data used in the estimation from the effect of bank deregulation, using the residuals of a regression on a binary variable taking value one after the event in each state. The question is whether nonstationary behavior subsists in these residuals. Table 3 paints a clear picture. In virtually all cases, we overwhelmingly reject the null hypothesis that returns, or their volatility, are non-stationary. Since there are no trends specified in the specifications of Table 3 , this also rejects the hypothesis that returns or their volatility be trend-stationary. We interpret this evidence as supportive of our assumption that sectoral returns, and their second moments, are time-invariant. They certainly vary over time, but in a mean-reverting fashion. 9
The assumption of stationarity in sectoral growth rates underpins a large literature in international macroeconomics. Many papers have sought, for instance, to decompose aggregate shocks into sectoral, regional, national or global components. Stockman (1988 ), Costello (1993 , Forni and Reichlin (1988) , and Koren and Tenreyro (2007) all assume a stationary structure of shocks. Kose et al (2003) use Bayesian techniques to assess whether the relative importance of different components has changed over time.
The effects of banking deregulation on reallocation
We first examine the convergence of a state towards its MVE frontier in the mean -standarddeviation space of returns (based on the distance measure D s,t defined in Section 3.1). This does not require taking a stance on the tangency portfolio on the frontier. Next, we investigate the convergence of expected output growth and volatility (µ s,t and σ s,t , respectively, as defined in Section 3.1) towards their levels at the tangency portfolio (µ * s and σ * s , respectively, also defined in Section 3.1). Finally, we study the convergence of output shares (w s,i,t ) towards those implied by the tangency portfolio (w * s,i ). converge to their MVE allocations, and at an accelerating rate following intrastate branching deregulation. We verify such convergence formally in Table 4A . We estimate equation (1) at two levels of aggregation, 18 or 10 sectors. Estimates of the direct auto-regressive coefficient on the Euclidean distance to frontier, α, imply a yearly reduction of about 37% in the distance to the MVE frontier. Importantly, the effect of intrastate deregulation interacts negatively with distance as seen from the estimated interaction coefficient β. Thus, deregulation hastens the convergence to the MVE frontier. In terms of magnitude, deregulation accelerates convergence by 10% per year. The magnitudes are roughly similar across the two levels of aggregation. The point estimates of α, β and γ for 18 sectors suggest deregulation lowers the long run Euclidian distance to the MVE frontier by a solid 20%.
Distance to frontier
In the second, third and fourth columns of Table 4A , we consider alternative measures of distance, which unlike our first definition rely on the specific tangency portfolio for each state, denoted as (µ * s , σ * s ) in Section 3.1. In the second column of coefficients, we employ the Euclidian distance to the tangency portfolio computed as
In the third and fourth columns, we employ the horizontal and the vertical distances to the tangency portfolio, computed as |σ s,t − σ * s | and |µ s,t − µ * s |, respectively. The convergence results are robust to these alternative measures. In all cases, there is around 20% to 30% reduction in distance each period, and deregulation of branching restrictions accelerates this reduction by 10% to 20%. For the rest of the paper, we employ our first measure, namely the Euclidian distance to the MVE frontier.
Growth and volatility
We next investigate whether the movement of states towards the MVE frontier following branching deregulation happens through changes in state-level growth, its volatility, or both.
Both changes would bring a state closer to its frontier, either via leftward movements (involving volatility) or via upward changes (involving growth). Table 4B provides econometric evidence purporting to answer this question with estimates of equations (2) Our results suggest that the primary effect of branching restrictions appears to have been to limit the diversification of activity in the state as a whole. The reallocation of output in a state following branching deregulation has little growth consequence for expected output, but induce a substantial diversification effect that manifests itself as lower expected volatility of output. This divergence in results regarding growth or volatility effects is reminiscent of and consistent with our results of Table 1 , and suggest reallocation across sectors is at play.
Output shares
We have so far focused on aggregate performance at the state level. To understand the effect of branching deregulation at a disaggregated level, we now investigate the convergence properties of the sector-wise allocation of output around deregulation dates.
In general, our computations suggest there are large differences between realized output shares w s,i,t and the corresponding MVE benchmark weights w * s,i . 10 In addition, the top five sectors in terms of their MVE weights typically account for between 80% and 90% of total output in the state. This structure is not uncommon to estimations of MVE frontiers: stable sectors end up getting most of the weight and the unconstrained estimation generally suggests short-selling some sectors. In our estimation, these get truncated to zero weights by construction. In contrast, realized output shares taper off much more gradually. Even for high weight sectors, realized output shares are smaller than the MVE weights by a large factor. A reason for this is that a number of sectors with weights truncated to zero in the estimation of the MVE frontier have realized weights that are greater than zero (even if tiny) and the sum of realized weights across these sectors adds up to being a non-trivial amount.
To address this issue, we make two adjustments. The first is implemented throughout the paper: Since the realized weights do not add up to one for sectors whose MVE weights turn out to be non-zero, we scale the realized weight of each such sector by the sum of realized weights of all such sectors. Estimation of convergence for the resulting weights is reported in the tables under the "Non Zero Weights" heading. This adjustment brings the scale of the realized and MVE weights more in line with each other. In results that follow, we report convergence properties where we retain all sectors (without any adjustment) but also where we focus only on adjusted non-zero weight sectors as described above.
The second adjustment we undertake is to eliminate the two most stable sectors in our data, as determined by their implied MVE weights, namely Government, and Health and Education. These also tend to be heavily regulated activities. 11 We report in Section 6.3 that even with complete exclusion of these two sectors from our analysis, conclusions are largely unchanged.
In Table 5 , we report the convergence properties of realized output shares, w s,i,t , based on equation (4). In the first column, we report results when all sectoral weights are employed without any scaling. The effect of deregulation, as estimated by the "Interaction" coefficient β, is to hasten convergence of realized weights towards the MVE benchmark. In particular, the convergence rate increases by about 0.6% to 0.8% per year. The magnitude of this effect is small relative to the estimates of convergence coefficients in Table 4 , for two state-level aggregate measures -distance to the frontier and volatility. But these point estimates capture the average convergence rate of a representative sector i in State s. In Table 5 , for instance, they suggest the distance between the long run output share of a representative sector and its MVE counterpart shrinks by approximately 5% because of deregulation. This may seem a small number, but the effects have to be compounded over 18 sectors. The corresponding end effects on State-level variables are potentially sizeable, as documented in Table 4 .
What is the relationship between the convergence in sectoral weights and the earlier convergence results, say in volatility? Indeed, it might seem at first blush that the coefficient of convergence in weights that is attributable to deregulation is far too small to produce the convergence effect of deregulation on volatility. This, however, is not the case. Note that sectoral weights enter in squared form, with a variance-covariance adjustment, in determining the volatility of output. It can be shown formally that the estimated shift in convergence of weights around deregulation (Table 5) can explain more than half of the estimated shift in convergence of volatility around deregulation (Table 4) , even if we assume away the uncertainty in the estimated coefficients. 12
The second column of coefficients reports results when only sectors with non-zero MVE weights are included. In this case, the interaction effect is weaker and with 10-sector aggreation, it disappears altogether. This suggests that the complementary set of sectors that have zero MVE weights is crucial to convergence. The number of such sectors is not small for most states and their exclusion clouds inference on convergence of sectoral allocations.
The two columns of results put together imply that part of the effect of deregulation is a re-composition of output away from those sectors that have zero MVE weights. This could happen because these sectors correspond to activities that are dominated in the meanvariance space, based on their risk-return tradeoff. Or because these are activities that the mean-variance optimization implies should be shorted, which translates into zero MVE weights. This suggests that zero MVE weights are not merely an artefact of the procedure computing the MVE frontier: they contain relevant information regarding the disappearance of certain sectors in the state. In fact, we found that the average rate of disappearance of such sectors, measured as the average annual percentage change in their sectoral weights, is 1.03% in deregulated state-years, against only 0.21% in non-deregulated state-years.
The magnitude of these convergence effects is best gauged using specialization episodes 12 The details of this exercise are available from authors upon request. that happened around deregulation dates. Consider for instance North Dakota, where intrastate deregulation happened in 1987. In un-tabulated results, we find that the change in output weights for North Dakota around the deregulation year is almost perfectly predicted by the ratio of MVE weights to initial weights (with an R 2 of over 80%). The sectoral allocation of output in North Dakota altered almost exactly in the way predicted by mean-variance portfolio theory around the year of deregulation. For instance, Lumber and Wood doubled its weight in the state's economy, a sector whose MVE weight is twenty times its actual pre-deregulation weight. In contrast, Retail fell by a fifth, and its MVE weight is half of its pre-deregulation weight. Interestingly, between 1977 and 2000 the contribution of sectors with zero MVE weights to North Dakota's output also fell by 10%.
Similarly, Illinois deregulated intrastate branching in 1988, and saw the share of Food and Paper fall by a quarter (its MVE weight is half the initial weight in 1977), Transport fell by 20% (it should fall by half according to its MVE weight), and Leisure and Business Services increased by 15% (its MVE weight is 150% of its initial level).
The nature of reallocation
Our results so far have established a strong relation between state-level banking deregulation and state-level reallocation in output shares across sectors. Did the deregulation of branching restrictions for banks cause this reallocation? To answer this important question, we examine the channels through which deregulation affects changes in sectoral allocations. As we explain below, this also helps allay concerns of reverse causality, based on the possibility that deregulation happened precisely in states that were expected to have sharp reallocations (for example in anticipation of exogenous technology shocks).
Which sectors converge faster?
We appeal to the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998) who study the effect of financial development on sectoral growth in an international setting. They conclude that financial development helps disproportionately more those sectors which are heavily dependent on external finance. Dependence on external finance or the inability to support investments through internal cash flows is (at least partly) attributable to sectoral-level technological factors such as payback periods and fixed costs of investment. Using data on capital expenditures and external finance issuance, Rajan and Zingales (1998) calculate explicit measures of external financial dependence. They also employ implicit measures, such as the age and 20 size of firms. The latter sectoral characteristics should imply informationally opaque activities, which may preclude easy access to capital markets and make them more reliant on bank finance. Rajan and Zingales (1998) demonstrate the presence and significance of the interaction term between financial development (a country characteristic) and external dependence (a sectoral characteristic common across countries) in explaining sectoral growth. The interaction effect helps put at ease the issue of endogeneity of financial development to anticipated growth. If expected technology shocks were the reason why financial deregulation became of the essence (perhaps to accommodate future growth), it is hard to think of reasons why these shocks would disproportionately concern sectors with an exogenous, given need for external finance, or ones that tend to be populated by young or small firms.
Our investigation of the channel through which bank branching deregulation affects the allocation of output across sectors is in the same spirit. If branching restrictions limit the access of banks to the entire spectrum of activities within a state, then the limitation is likely to be felt most severely by those sectors which are most dependent on external finance.
If the limitation arises because of information frictions, then sectors with young and small firms may be restricted from obtaining bank financing and also suffer relative to activities populated by more mature or larger firms. Thus, the relaxation of branching restrictions should increase the output shares of these sectors.
This leaves open the following question: where does the capital allocated to financially constrained activities come from? It is possible that banks are able to raise more capital following financial deregulation (since they can become more diversified). It is also possible that they become more efficient, for instance, because increased competition improves the pricing of loans, as documented in Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) . 13 Finally, it is possible that the pool of capital remains unchanged with deregulation, in which case any reallocation would be purely due to transfers of capital away from unconstrained sectors to constrained ones. In all these cases, however, allocations will favor activities that need it most, where we should therefore see faster convergence. Convergence in unconstrained sectors may still happen, but not necessarily. That depends partly on whether there is overall expansion of capital in the state or merely transfers across sectors. In other words, convergence should be clear in constrained sectors, but not in unconstrained ones.
We split our sample according to a variety of external dependence measures, and estimate equation (4) separately for all sub-samples. We use four measures of external dependence for each sector, computed using the COMPUSTAT dataset for all firms in that sector over the period 1994 to 2005. 14 We compute: (i) Age, measured as the average age of firms in the sector; (ii) Dependence, defined and measured as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) , as the ratio of net external finance issues (sale of common and preference stock and debt minus purchase of common and preference stock and debt) to capital expenditures; (iii) Sales, a proxy for firm size measured by the average sales of firms in the sector; and, (iv) Assets, another proxy for firm size, measured by the book value of firm assets. Based on these four measures, we partition our sectors into below-and above-median samples, and label them Young and Old, Unconstrained and Constrained, Small and Large, and Low and High, respectively.
In Table 6A , we report the convergence properties of sectoral shares of output based on these four sample splits. Overall, the results confirm expectations. We find that the acceleration of convergence to MVE weights is most pronounced for Young, Constrained, Small and Low Assets sectors. There, the coefficient β is negative, significant and at least two to three times larger compared to the complementary samples. The discrepancy is significant at conventional confidence levels in two cases, and marginally significant in the two others.
To further illuminate the mechanisms at work, we ask whether Young, Constrained, Small and Low Assets sectors have initial allocations that are significantly below their MVE weights, but final allocations that cannot be distinguished from MVE weights. In Table 6B , we present probit estimates of the probability that initial and final weights be below their MVE level, P r(w i,s,T < w * i,s ), as a function of the median values for Age, Dependence, Sales and Assets for sector i. T equals 1977 for initial weights and 2000 for final weights. Note that since any non-zero realized weight is mechanically greater than a zero MVE weight, we are forced in this analysis to restrict attention to sectors with non-zero MVE weights. The results are striking. The sample splits always matter significantly for the initial level of realized allocation: in 1977, the probability of a sector being below its MVE size is significantly decreasing in Age, (the inverse of) Dependence, Sales and Assets. In contrast, in 2000 these sector characteristics are not as relevant. In particular, Age, Sales and Assets have become insignificant in explaining the probability of allocation being lower than the MVE one (though Dependence has not).
Taken together, these results suggest that banking deregulation in the US produced a reallocation across sectors by primarily increasing the output share of younger, smaller and more external finance dependent firms.
Next, we analyze the mean and volatility of realized returns (R s,i,t ) across constrained and unconstrained sectors. This is motivated by the theoretical contribution of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) , who argue that investments in high risk, high return sectors may not be attractive unless a critical level of diversification is reached. A direct implication is that risky sectors should contribute more to overall growth once diversification is possible. In Table   6C , we regress the average of realized returns R s,i,t and their time-series volatility on binary variables capturing whether sector i is populated by Old, Unconstrained, Large and High Assets firms. In all cases, returns are lower for mature, unconstrained and large sectors, by around 1%. Volatility is lower for Large and High Assets sectors but surprisingly higher for Old and Unconstrained sectors. Combined with the evidence in Table 6B , we conclude that the fraction of state's output that is generated by sectors with both high returns and high volatility is likely to increase following bank branching deregulation. This effect is consistent with banks having better access to diversification post-deregulation, and as a result, lending to riskier sectors as proposed by Acemoglu and Zilibotti. In terms of economic magnitudes, the cross-state average share of GSP contributed by Young, Dependent, Small and Low Assets sectors had 1977 values of 51%, 40%, 52%, and 43%, respectively. By 2000, these shares had grown to 60%, 44%, 60%, and 48%, respectively. These sectors, which on average grow faster by 1% a year, have thus become more important to state economies, by 10% to 15%.
Which states converge faster?
We now examine the characteristics of states that converge faster post-deregulation. We split states according to three criteria. In Table 7 , we report estimates corresponding to equation (1) for Euclidean distance to the frontier (Panel A), and to equation (4) for sectoral weights in output (Panel B). We first consider a simple variant of the sector splits employed in the previous section. Specifically, we divide states into two groups based on above and below median values of state-level firm age, calculated as an output-weighted average of sector-level (average) firm age for the state in 1977. The results are consistent with those for sector splits.
States with a greater share of output in sectors that are populated by younger firms converge significantly faster post-deregulation. Estimates of β for these states are negative, significant, and two to four times as large as that for the complementary set of states.
We do not report state-level splits for the other measures employed in Section 5.1, as results are quite similar from a qualitative as well as a quantitative standpoint. Instead, we bring in alternative data available at the state level for the US. In particular, in a recent paper Demyanyk, Ostergaard and Sorensen (2007) employ firm-level data on the number of employees, from the Geospatial and Statistical Data Center, maintained at the University of Virginia library. 15 Using these data, we calculate Firm Size as the 1977 share of firms with fewer than 20 employees in overall state employment. We then split states into samples around the median values of Firm Size. Panels A and B of Table 7 reveal that states that are populated by many small firms have negative and significant values of β, at least two to three times larger than in states with relatively fewer small firms. Remarkably, the split is always significantly relevant at conventional confidence levels.
These results are consistent with a stronger effect of banking deregulation in states with younger and smaller firms, likely to be more reliant on bank financing. Finally, we exploit the idea that bank branching restrictions are less likely to have bite in those states that are small.
There, we conjecture, the information frictions that prevent a bank from lending to the entire spectrum of borrowers in the state are less important. We split states around the US median value of state geographical area. We expect that the convergence effect of deregulation should be significantly stronger for larger states. The estimates in Table 7 confirm the conjecture. 6 Robustness 6.1 Restricting analysis to states with "clean" frontier One potential criticism of our methodology for computing MVE frontiers is that it employs data on sectoral returns pre-as well as post-deregulation dates. In Table 8A , we demonstrate empirically that this concern does not seem to create a bias in our estimations. In particular, we restrict attention to those 16 states that deregulated their branching restrictions early enough in our sample to give us at least 12 years of data post-deregulation. For these states, we compute an uncontaminated frontier for 10 aggregated sectors, and repeat the estimation of equations (1)-(4). As in Tables 5 and 6 , deregulation hastens convergence towards the MVE frontier through a volatility effect, but not through a growth effect. As before, sectoral shares of output converge to their benchmark values faster following deregulation, but only when we include sectors with zero benchmark weights. The magnitude of the coefficient estimates is also roughly similar.
Alternative benchmark allocations
In order to illustrate the importance of the covariance structure of sectoral returns -rather than simply their growth rates -we estimate a benchmark frontier where all the covariance terms in the estimation are set to zero (sectoral variances are still allowed to vary across states). The first column of coefficients in Table 8B shows that this benchmark is simply unable to explain the convergence properties of sector weights in state-level output. Estimates for α and β are close to one and zero, respectively. Covariances between sectors matter, which is not surprising since they arise naturally in state business cycles. More importantly, this assuages the concern that high growth sectors mechanically see increasing allocations because we measure w s,i,t with observed output shares. We do not merely find reallocation towards high growth sectors. Convergence is significant only when the covariance of returns across sectors is appropriately accounted for in benchmark allocation.
Recent contributions in the literature on portfolio optimization suggest that simple investment criteria such as allocating 1 N of the portfolio share to each of the N assets achieves better performance than more complex schemes such as MVE weights, because of an estimation error in computing MVE weights (see DeMiguel, Garlappi and Uppal (2007) ). We show this 1 N criterion also does a poor job at explaining the evolution of realized allocation across sectors. In the second column of Table 8B , we find that there is no convergence toward this benchmark. Estimates of α are again close to one, and the interaction effect of deregulation on convergence is insignificant. We conclude that 1 N is not a useful benchmark for the issue at hand either.
To summarize, although the intuitively simple notion of mean-variance efficiency has been argued to have limitations, it is a useful benchmark at least in a positive sense. For individual US states, the observed output shares of different sectors converge towards the state-level mean-variance efficient frontiers. Alternatively defined frontiers do not appear successful in explaining the convergence properties of sectoral output shares.
Excluding stable and regulated sectors
Next, we check whether our conclusions are altered by the exclusion of exceptionally stable sectors that end up having large weights in the typical MVE portfolio. In particular, Government and Health and Education (GHE) consistently receive large weights, because their returns tend to be high on average but with low volatility. This may happen for reasons that are partly artificial since these sectors are heavily regulated. They should not necessarily enter the MVE portfolio optimization. We also exclude Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) since returns there are likely to be endogenous to the specific regulation under study.
The rightmost four columns of Table 8B present estimates for equation (4) evaluated over the remaining sectors when GHE and FIRE are excluded. In all cases, we re-compute the frontier as if these sectors were simply not part of the economy. The estimates reveal clearly that the interaction between convergence and branching deregulation does not depend on these specific sectors. The interaction coefficients continue to be significant in all cases where they were in Table 5 , and indeed are of similar economic magnitude.
Alternative values for the risk-free rate
In the tests reported in Sections 4 and 5, we set the risk-free rate to zero when identifying tangency portfolio on the MVE frontier. Our results are not particularly sensitive to the choice of a risk-free rate. In Table 8C , we estimate equation (4) with alternative values.
In particular, we present evidence based on values for the risk-free rate of 2% and 4%.
There is no substantial difference between Table 5 and Table 8C . 16 Our interpretation is the following. Convergence appears to have operated primarily through volatility changes, or through a leftward movement towards the MVE frontier. Therefore, a specific choice of the risk-free rate, which implies a tangency portfolio, is not the critical driver of convergence.
Realized output weights on sectors would converge towards that of a candidate tangency portfolio as long as that tangency portfolio is reached through a leftward move towards the frontier. This does not depend crucially on the level of the risk free rate. 17
GMM estimation
The last column in Table 8C reports estimates corresponding to the GMM estimator introduced by Blundell and Bond (1998) . The approach corrects for the bias arising in fixed effect 16 We also experimented with 7%, with no differences in results. 17 In fact, MVE weights as implied by different values of the risk free rate are highly correlated. For instance, the correlation between weights as implied by a 2% (4%) risk free rate and those implied by a zero risk free rate equals 0.91 (0.77).
estimations of dynamic models. The correction has proved to be especially relevant for coefficient estimates on the lagged dependent variable. Table 8C confirms our results continue to obtain with GMM.
The endogeneity of deregulation dates
We consider the possibility that the reform of branching in the US was endogenous to growth prospects in various states. We have already shown that deregulations have heterogeneous effects across sectors, depending on exogenous characteristics, which assuages some endogeneity concerns. In addition, Kroszner and Strahan (1999) and Kroszner (2001) provide support that widespread banking failures in the 1980s and technological advance were the two main, exogenous events that triggered deregulation. In related work, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that the magnitude of bank lending and investment remained broadly unchanged around deregulation dates. If deregulation had been warranted by high growth prospects, it is likely that bank lending would have accelerated as a whole. Jayaratne and Strahan conclude that it is the efficiency of lending that improved, a result that is entirely consistent with this paper's results.
We verify that deregulation is indeed not endogenous to the nature of reallocation, which we measure using our frontier metric. Figure 2 plots for different states the number of years since intrastate deregulations, against the initial distance to the MVE frontier. If deregulation responded to prospective reallocation, the correlation should be positive. Such is not the case. Linear fits to the data in the figure reveal essentially zero slope coefficient. 18
Hence, our results are unlikely to be an artefact of the endogeneity of branching deregulation to states' reallocation of output shares across sectors.
Interstate banking flows
Our measure of financial deregulation is a binary variable, by definition unable to capture how much the lifting of branching restrictions favored reallocation. An attractive alternative is introduced in Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) , who compute the total out-of-state assets held by holding companies operating in state s in year t, divided by total assets in state s.
This provides a continuous variable, capturing the magnitude of the flows in banking capital 18 The slope is weakly negative. This is not surprising. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) document that the primary rationale for states introducing branching restrictions was to increase state revenues from local banks, to restrict competition, create local monopolies, grant more charters and simply extract greater rents. The delay in deregulation and the resulting reallocation may thus both be linked to the underlying political economy of the state government, an endogeneity that in fact may bias us against the effects we find. across states. Of course, the variable is more relevant to interstate branching deregulation. In the data however, the dates for interstate and intrastate deregulations are highly correlated, and their effects can not be identified separately. 19 We replace DEREG s,t in the estimation of equations (1) and (4) by F low s,t , the Other State Asset Ratio measure introduced by Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) . The variable captures the share of total out-of-state assets held by holding companies also operating out of the state, and thus approximates the intensity of out-of-state capital inflows. Table 9 presents the results for equations (1) and (4) replacing DEREG s,t with F low s,t and restricting data to the post interstate deregulation periods. The restriction is natural since F low s,t is by definition zero prior to interstate branching deregulation. The continuity of F low s,t as a variable also helps assess whether convergence responds to the strength of interstate bank linkages, rather than solely to a binary variable capturing deregulation. The results are overall similar to those obtained in Tables 4 and 5. Specifically, even during the post interstate deregulation period, convergence is faster in those years when out-of-state banks have a large participation in local banks' capital.
Changes in banks' characteristics
Finally, we illustrate that it is the emergence of larger, better-diversified and healthier banks following branching deregulation that leads to reallocation, rather than a simple, mechanical change in the market structure of the banking sector. In the second column of coefficients in Table 9 , we run a horse-race between F low s,t and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of bank concentration in the state, with weights in the index implied by the deposit base of each bank.
We find that the effect of interstate banking flows on convergence is robust to controlling for bank concentration in the state. In fact bank concentration by itself (after controlling for flows) impedes convergence. In unreported results, we find that replacing the Herfindahl index by the number of banks or branches in the state produces similar results.
Convergence due to out-of-state flows may be faster simply because in-state banks were inefficient prior to deregulation. 20 Hence, in the third column of Table 9 , we control for the 19 In fact, in Diamond (1984) , the ability to diversify enables banks to raise greater capital. Then, intrastate branching deregulation may be effective in spurring convergence to efficiency only if accompanied by interstate branching deregulation, which allows a free flow of banking capital across state borders.
20 At the bank level, deregulation should also offer the best performers more scope for growth and introduce discipline through a higher likelihood of being taken over. Both of these should result in larger, better banks and increased efficiency. Indeed, Strahan (2003) shows that deregulation led to larger banks operating across a wider geographical area and Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) report that non-interest costs, wages and loan losses all fell after states deregulated branching. effect of the health of banks operating in a state. We approximate this with the average state capital to assets ratio, i.e., the total capital of banks operating in the state divided by their total assets. Again, we find that the acceleration of convergence to efficiency in response to interstate banking flows is robust to this control. In this case however, the health of the banking sector also contributes to the acceleration.
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
We use the concept of static mean-variance efficiency to structure our analysis of the dynamics of specialization in output. In its conventional applications, which pertain to the allocation of capital across financial assets, static mean-variance efficiency is rapidly losing its appeal.
In a positive sense, we find it interesting that it should help understand the allocation of real output. It fits naturally with, and in fact brings together, the largely disjoint segments of the literature on the growth and volatility effects of access to finance. As we now show, the concept also contributes to explaining the unconditional evolution of patterns of sectoral output in the US states, that is, even outside of the deregulation effects.
We compute a measure of the bilateral (dis-)similarity in the allocation of output between states. We calculate the sum of absolute distances between realized output allocations at a given point of time: For a pair of states s and u, define Gap t = i |w s,i,t −w u,i,t |. In Table 10, we examine the convergence properties of Gap t in an auto-regressive specification. In Column 1, we allow for year effects and state-pair fixed effects, whereas in Columns 2 and 3, we only have year effects. In Column 1, we show the dis-similarities of output allocation across states have a permanent component, as testified by the significant intercept. This continues to be the case in Column 2, where country-pair specific intercepts are omitted. This confirms the importance of a state dimension in our data. Even in the long run, patterns of output are different across states, and do not converge towards a vector of common, national, output shares.
What is the source of these permanent discrepancies in the sectoral allocations of output across states? An answer is provided in Column 3 where we compute Gap * t = Gap t − i |w * s,i − w * u,i |, which controls for the cross-state discrepancies in benchmark MVE allocations. Note that by construction, the MVE allocation is time-invariant and thus so is the measure Gap * t . Column 3 shows that the intercept ceases to be significant once permanent differences in MVE allocations are accounted for. In other words, the long run differences in observed output 29 shares across states are well explained by the gap in the benchmark allocations implied by the MVE frontier estimated state by state. 21
In short, mean-variance efficiency appears to be an empirically plausible candidate to explain the long run properties of output allocation in US states. We have shown that convergence to the MVE benchmark is accelerated by financial development, with focus on the deregulation of bank-branching restrictions. This acceleration seems to correspond to an improved diversification of output, translating in lower volatility rather than faster growth.
Since our approach concentrates on pure reallocation effects, this is not saying that growth has not responded. Indeed it has, but not via reallocation effects.
Our conclusions are strongest in sectors that are populated by young, small and financially constrained firms, and they are indeed often absent from the complementary samples.
They are also strongest in states that are populated by high numbers of small and young firms, and, interestingly, in large states. These differential effects highlight the exact nature of reallocation induced by financial development, and indirectly signify the importance of banks for small, young, financially constrained firms as well as the local (even if gradually diminishing) component of expertise in bank lending.
Finally, our contribution is methodological in nature. With a large ongoing interest in quantifying the real effects of financial integration, and in particular a mounting body of evidence supportive of real effects on economic growth, our mean-variance approach unbundles some of the mechanisms at play. We are able to pinpoint whether finance induces reallocation through diversification of output or simply produces higher output. We are further able to characterize the very nature of finance-induced specialization: which activities and sectors benefit, which do not, and why. The richness of our methodology may thus be useful in a variety of contexts, for instance for analyzing the causes, nature and effects of international financial flows. Notes: Age and Size splits are based on the position of the representative firm in state s relative to the median across states. Representative firm age in state s is the industry-weighted average firm age in 1977. Representative firm size in state s is the 1977 share in overall state employment of firms with fewer than 20 employees. State areas are split around their median value across states. In panel A, all estimations include a state-specific intercept and year effects. In panel B, all estimations include a state-industry specific intercept and year effects. Standard errors are clustered by state, and reported between parentheses. *** (**, *) denote significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) confidence level. P-Values correspond to the null-hypothesis that β is identical in both sub-samples. Notes: The sample is reduced to fully deregulated state years. In panel A, all estimations include a state-specific intercept and year effects. In panel B, all estimations include a state-industry specific intercept and year effects. Standard errors are clustered by state, and reported between parentheses. Concentration denotes the Herfindahl-Hirschman index computed on the basis of deposit bases. Capital/Assets denotes the ratio of total capital of banks operating in the state, divided by their total assets. *** (**, *) denote significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) confidence level. 
